Section 5 of the Clayton Act and the Nolo Contendere Plea by unknown
SECTION 5 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AND THE
NOLO CONTENDERE PLEA
In order to insure the effectiveness of the Sherman Act,' Congress
assigned an important policing role to private parties; persons2 injured
by an antitrust violation were allowed to bring an action for treble
damages against the offender. As originally conceived, private enforce-
ment was intended to operate independently of Government prosecu-
tion.3 But by 1914 Congress recognized that the private litigant could
not perform his function without assistance.4 In that year Congress
attempted to strengthen the private enforcement scheme by enacting
1. 26 Stat. 209 (1890). as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (194).
2. The "persons" authorized to invoke the treble damage action provision included
corporations and assodations existing under the laws of the United States, of any state
or territory, or of any foreign country. This has been held to encompass municipalities,
Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). and states,
Georgia v. Evans, 316 US. 159 (1942). But the United States was excluded as a beneficiary
of the treble damage action. United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S. 600 (1941). In 1955 Con-
gress added section 4A to the Clayton Act to permit the United States the additional
remedy of a private action, but only for actual damages. 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C.
§ 15a (194). The purposes and effects of the treble recovery arc discussed in McConnell,
The Treble Damage Action, 1950 U. ILL. L.F. 659; Void, Are Threefold Damages Under
the Antitrust Act Penal or Compensatory? 28 KY. L.J. 117 (1940).
3. See Statement of Walton Hamilton, Hearings on H.R. 7905 Before the Subcommittee
on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Committee on the judiciary, 81st Cong..
2d Sess., 56 (1950).
4. See 51 CONG. R c. 13,851 (1914) (remarks of Senator Walsh): "We all know that the
private individual is always at a disadvantage. He is never armed with the means at his
command to cope with these great organizations; and that was the very reason why this
act was passed -.. ." See id. at 15,825 (remarks of Senator Reed); id. at 16.046 (remarks
of Senator Norris). The first twenty-five years of the Sherman Act produced only forty-six
private actions, of which plaintiffs were successful in only four. A. D. Neale, TnE A.%nn-
TRUSt LAWS oF THE UNrrim STATm oF AMERiCA 389 (1960). Undoubtedly the private liti-
gants' lack of success during this period may be in part attributable to the general unfa-
miliarity in the legal community with the meaning of the new law. But equally significant
was the fact that private suitors were not equipped with the tools to promote independent
antitrust enforcement. One of the most essential ingredients of law enforcement is the
power to detect and investigate possible infractions and then to apprehend the wrong-
doers. The private litigant, however, without the services of a grand jury and without the
powers of subpoena or discovery, was helpless to conduct any meaningful inquiry. And
the treble damage action furnished to him by Congress was not useful for that purpose.
That remedy, by itself, was hardly an enforcement tool in this sense; it was no more than
a potential for inflicting severe punishment once the offender was detected and appre-
hended. For a picturesque account of the formidable burden of private litigants prior to
1914 see V. HAMILTON & I. TILL, ANTrrmusr IN AcTloN, 82-83 (TNEC Monograph No. 16,
1940).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Section 5 of the Clayton Act,5 which allowed private suitors to intro-
duce as prima facie evidence of violation the judgments entered in
prior Government proceedings against the same defendants for the
same offense. However, Congress added a proviso making Section 5
inapplicable to "consent judgments or decrees entered before any tes-
timony has been taken." In order to enjoy the benefits of the proviso,
antitrust defendants revived the nolo contendere plea.7 That plea has
since become a standard fixture in criminal antitrust cases, and its
value to defendants is incalculable.
Since a case disposed of on a nolo plea will involve a trial only on
the issue of punishment, the plea relieves a defendant of the great
burden in time, expense,8 and personal inconvenience involved in
making a full defense. The plea, furthermore, is attractive to defen-
dants because it "does not normally carry with it in the courts or in
5. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964). The text of Section 5 as
originally enacted read, in part:
That a final judgment or decree hereafter rendered in any criminal prosecution or
in any suit or proceeding in equity brought by or on behalf of the United States
under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall
be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any suit or proceeding brought
by any other party against such defendant under said laws as to all matters respect.
ing which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel between the parties thereto:
Provided, this section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before
any testimony has been taken."
The section was amended in 1955 to permit the United States to introduce its own prior
judgments as prima facie evidence in its own private damage actions under the newly
enacted Section 4A of the Clayton Act. 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
6. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
7. For discussion on the history and characteristics of the nolo contendere plea see
Lenvin & Myers, Nolo Contendere: Its Nature and Implications, 51 YAL, L.J. 1255 (1942);
Comment, Nolo Contendere-Its Use and Effect, 52 CALw. L. REv. 408 (1964). See also
Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926). Because nolo contendere is but an "implied
confession," it establishes the fact of guilt solely for the purpose of the particular case
in which it is tendered and accepted. Accordingly, in a subsequent civil action predicated
upon the same set of facts to which the defendant pleaded nolo in the criminal proceed-
ing the plea will not be admissible against the defendant as an evidentiary admission to
prove those facts, and the defendant will not be estopped from denying them. It Is this
feature of the nolo plea that distinguishes it from the plea of guilty, and accounts for tile
difference of treatment accorded to the two pleas for the purpose of § 5.
8. The costs of defense is one of the primary concerns of the antitrust defendant. In
fact, one commentator remarked: "Many defendants will enter into a consent decree
and plead nolo contendere even though in their minds and hearts they are satisfied that
they have never violated the antitrust laws. The pressure there is the avoidance of an
expensive or a lengthy trial." See Testimony of Milton Handler, Hearings on H.R. 7095
Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Committce on
the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1950).
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the public mind the same stigma of knowing guilt and moral turpitude
as does the plea or conviction of guilty." Defendants plead nolo to
avoid adverse publicity, and for this reason the plea is useful even
when the possibility of subsequent private actions is limited. 10 The
primary value of the nolo contendere plea to the antitrust defendant,
however, is that a judgment entered upon its acceptance is a "consent
9. Memorandum of the Government in Opposition to the Acceptance of Pleas of Nolo
Contendere 4-5, I Antitrust Pleading File, United States v. Westinghouse Co., Cr. 20234
(E.D. Pa.) (The Antitrust Division Pleading File, cited hereinafter as Antitrust Pleading
File, is located in the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.).
It may be, and often is, instead characterized as a "'compromise" between the defen-
dants and the Government, or as a confession of technical guilt under circumstances
where the violation of the law involved results from an honest disagreement as to
the proper scope of the law rather than as a conscious and knowing attempt to vio-
late the criminal laws of the United States.
Ibid.
Part of the desire of the antitrust defendant to avoid the stigma of criminal conviction
is the belief that the offense committed, being of an economic nature, is necessarily less
reprehensible and should entitle the wrongdoer to special consideration. One defense
attorney, pressing for acceptance of a nolo plea, reflected this attitude:
[]hese acts involved in these indictments are said to be violations of these regula-
tory measures that deal with the economy of the country. . . . [We arc not con-
cerned . . . with crimes of violence . .. or other serious crimes against the Gov-
ernment; we are dealing here with crimes having to do with the regulation of the
economy....
United States v. Westinghouse Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 76753, 76755 (E.D. Pa.). This notion
was strongly rejected by Judge Weinfeld in United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color
Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1955):
The concept that antitrust violations really are "minor" and "technical" infractions,
involve no wrongdoing, and merely constitute "white collar" offenses, has no place in
the administration of justice.
A conviction upon a nolo plea may, however, have some minor undesirable conse-
quences. In some jurisdictions it is not treated differently from any other conviction.
Hence the nolo conviction could make the defendant a multiple offender for the purposes
of collateral proceedings. And the plea may be admissible in subsequent litigation for the
purpose of impeaching the witness. Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.d 779, 785 (2d
Cir. 1947). See generally, Lenvin & Myers, Nolo Contendere: Its Nature and Implications,
supra note 7.
10. In one unusual case, United States v. American Oil Co., 65 Cr. 150(S) (E.D. Mo.
1965), for example, eighteen defendant oil companies pleaded nolo contendere to charges
of price fixing and bid rigging in connection with certain contracts with the State of
Missouri. The state was the only party subject to injury by the alleged violation and
therefore the only party which could have sued for treble damages. However, prior to
the entry of their plea the defendants effectively insulated themselves from exposure to
treble damages by mysteriously volunteering to the state approximately $2 million in
"damages" and obtaining in return a covenant not to sue. Subsequently the corporate
officials issued numerous public statements alleging ignorance of any activities constituting
antitrust violations. Government's Brief, Antitrust Pleading File, United States v. Amer-
ican Oil Co., 65 Cr. 150(3) (E.D. Mo. 1965).
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judgment" within the proviso to Section 5 and therefore cannot be
used as prima facie evidence of guilt in subsequent private actions."
Whether the antitrust defendant will enjoy these advantages in a
given case depends, in theory at least, upon the exercise of discretion
by the courts under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure,12 which provides that a defendant may plead nolo contendere
"with consent of the court.'u In practice, the Government's position
regarding the propriety of the nolo plea in individual cases has be-
come an important and sometimes decisive criterion in the decision
under Rule 11.
THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON NOLO CONTENDERE PLEAS
Three possible positions seem available to the Government in estab-
lishing a consistent policy regarding nolo pleas. It could always acqui-
esce in or always oppose every attempt to plea nolo contendere. Or
the Government could proceed on a case by case basis.
Prior to 1953 it was the practice of the Government not to oppose
acceptance of nolo contendere pleas. And it was the practice of the
courts to allow the plea as a matter of course. In that year the Attor-
ney General, observing that "uncontrolled use of the plea has led to
shockingly low sentences and insignificant fines which are no deterrent
to crime,"'14 initiated the policy of opposing the plea except "in the
most unusual circumstances."'l5
11. The question was first raised and settled in Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co.,
26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939), afJ'd, 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
644 (1941). There it had been urged that "a consent judgment in a criminal case is an
anomaly in legal parlance." 26 F. Supp. at 371. The court conceded that "strictly speak-
ing" the phenomenon of a consent judgment in a criminal proceeding may not exist, but,
upon an examination of the legislative history and purpose of the proviso, responded:
If Congress intended to designate judgments entered on pleas of guilty or nolo con-
tendere, before any testimony had been taken, as consent judgments, this Court must
give effect to such intention, however unusual or inappropriate the expression may be.
Ibid. See also General Elec. Co. v. City of San Antonio, 334 F.2 480 (5th Cir. 1964); City
of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964); Commonwealth Edison Co.
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 959 (1964).
12. 18 U.S.C., App. at 3748 (1964).
13. Ibid.
14. The Attorney General's position, set out in a memorandum to the United States
Attorneys, is quoted in United States v. Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288, 289 n.1 (S.D. Calif. 1954).
It stated:
One of the factors which has tended to breed contempt for federal law enforcement
in recent times has been the practice of permitting as a matter of course in many
criminal indictments the plea of nolo contendere. While it may serve a legitimate
purpose in a few extraordinary situations . . . I can see no justification for It in
everyday practice, particularly where it is used to avoid certain indirect consequences
of pleading guilty. ...
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In reversing the former practice of acquiescence in all cses, tie Gov-
ernment necessarily rejected an interpretation of the proviso to Section
5 under which the antitrust defendant would have an unqualified right
to capitulate without trial.1 Such a construction of Section 5 attrib-
utes to Congress an intent to induce submission of defendants by
imposing a penalty on those who insist on going to trial. The induce-
ment is, on this reading of the statute, embodied in the proviso, and
the penalty lies in the prima facie evidence provision in the body of
Section 5. The "defendant's right" theory of Section 5, which would
require the Government to acquiesce in every case, has been based, in
part, on interpretations of legislative history. One Congressman, for
example, offered this explanation of Section 5:
Uncontrolled use of the plea has led to shockingly low sentences and insignificant
fines which are no deterrent to crime. As a practical matter it accomplishes little that
is useful even where the Government has civil litigation pending. Moreover, a person
permitted to plead nolo contendere admits guilt for the purpose of imposing punish-
ment for his acts and yet, for all other purposes, and as far as the public is con-
cerned, persists in his denial of wrongdoing. It is no wonder that the public regards
consent to such a plea by the Government as an admission that it has only a tech-
nical case at most and that the whole proceeding was just a fiasco.
15. Id. at 290. The change of policy was met by resistance in the courts. See. eg..
United States v. Jones, supra note 14, at 290, where the court responded to the Attorney
General's memorandum:
While this may be an overall command from the head of an Executive Department
to his subordinates, it does not purport to be, nor could it be, anything more. It is
not binding upon the Court. . . . Even if the United States Attorney is forbidden
to do so, the Court must exercise its discretion in each case... [A]nd in the absence
of some reason why a defendant should not have the benefit of the plea. the Court
will ordinarily allow it to be entered.
Some courts found it necessary to determine whether or not the Government's opposition
was "seriously offered," or whether it was just implementing a general policy of opposition
to nolo pleas. See, e.g., United States v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n, 1959 Trade Cas. 75.651 (S.D.
N.Y.) (Court accepted the pleas, taking into account Government's general policy). To
overcome the courts' resistance, the Government on occasions has had to make special
attempts to impress upon the court the importance of denial of the nolo pleas. In
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 76.753 (E.D. Pa.), for example,
the Attorney General submitted an affidavit to the court in which he alleged that "these
indictments charge as serious instances of bid-rigging and price-fixing as have been charged
in the more than half-century life of the Sherman Act." Affidavit of William P. Rogers.
the Attorney-General of the United States, in Opposition to Pleas of Nolo Contendere 2,
I Antitrust Pleading File, United States v. Westinghouse Corp., Cr. 20234 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
In addition, the Acting Assistant Attorney-General in charge of the Antitrust Division
appeared in person to present the Government's oral argument in opposition to the pleas.
1960 Trade Cas. 76,753-54.
16. The view that the proviso to Section 5 grants to the antitrust defendant an "un-
qualified right" to capitulate has been accepted by some courts. See, e.g.. United States v.
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 203 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Wis. 1962); United States v. Ward
Baking Co., 1963 Trade Cas. 77499 (NJ). Fla.), vacated and remanded, 376 U.S. 327
(1964) (both cases involved civil consent decrees).
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If the Government brings a suit against a trust or monopoly and
it surrenders, we eliminate the effect of the "prima facie" judg-
ment. If it fights and loses, then the "prima facie" effect is given to
the final judgment .... 17
This construction of Section 5 and the evidence adduced to support
it may easily be dismissed. Although the proviso to Section 5 might
be seen as an inducement for defendants to capitulate, its primary
concern was not with defendants' "rights" but rather with the added
burden imposed on the Government by the body of Section 5. The
draftsmen apparently felt that the prima facie evidence provision
would hinder the Government's effort to obtain relief without trial
by making defendants unwilling to negotiate. The proviso was viewed
as a way to ease the Government's enforcement burden and minimize
expense.' s Although the proviso is an awkward attempt to achieve this
end, it cannot be read to declare a right of every antitrust defendant
to submit without trial. It is incongruous to say that a defendant has
a right to save the Government time and money. The proviso merely
says that a judgment shall not have prima facie effect if it is rendered
before any testimony has been taken. Properly read, the proviso talks
17. 51 CONG. REc. 16,276 (1914) (remarks of Representative Webb); see id. at 15,824
(remarks of Senator Lewis).
18. See, e.g., the views of Representative Graham on the original Section 5:
From the standpoint of the Government, the proposal to make Government decrees
conclusive in private suits is open to serious objection. In various proceedings taken
by the Government under the Sherman Act, parties have been persuaded to consent
to decrees granting all the relief which the Government demanded. Such consent
decrees have accomplished, without the consumption of the time and expense Involved
in conducting prosecutions, all the relief which could be obtained by successful liti.
gation. No hindrance should be put in the way of the Department of Justice in
respect of these negotiations.
If this proposal were enacted, it would deter any company from ever consenting
to the entry of a decree in a Government suit under the antitrust laws; for such a
decree would simply invite a flood of litigation that might bankrupt any company.
[Emphasis added.)
H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 9-10 (1914) (Minority Report). The orig.
inal Section 5 contained a second proviso that exempted from the application of the
prima facie evidence provision judgments entered in suits then pending in which the
Government was negotiating for consent decrees. This proviso, according to one Senator,
was
put in with a view to facilitating the Government to carry out consent matters which
had been entered into in the form of settlement in equity proceedings wherein the
defendant had possibly come into court and agreed upon a decree and thus relieved
the Government of the necessity of taking evidence and the great expense incident
thereto. [Emphasis added.)
51 CON(;. Rc. 15,824 (1914) (remarks of Senator Lewis). See id. at 16,276 (remarks of
Representative Webb).
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about what happens after a judgment has been entered; it gives to
defendants an assurance that if their surrender is accepted the judg-
ment entered will not be admissible against them as prima facie evi-
dence in subsequent proceedings. If the proviso declares any right at
all, it would belong to the Government, not to the defendant.
There is slight support for the "defendant's right" theory in the
belief of some Congressmen that the phrase "consent judgments" in
the proviso included judgments entered after guilty pleas.D If the
defendant can control the application of the proviso to this extent
(surely the defendant has the "right" to plead guilty), then the "defen-
dant's right" theory of nolo pleas cannot be rejected simply on the
theory that Congress should not be taken as having given control of
the proviso to defendants. But the members of Congress who read the
proviso to include pleas of guilty appear to have been only those who
opposed the entire proviso as being a concession to the monopolies and
an abandonment of the principles of the Sherman Act.20 This tactic of
exaggerating the meaning of a provision is often used by its opponents.
In any event the legislative history shows that there was no consensus
on the status of a guilty plea under the proviso.2'1
19. See, e.g., 51 CoNG REc. 16,046 (1914) (remarks of Senator Norris): "The real effect
of that proviso is to make the section inapplicable to cases in which consent judgments
have been taken in cases where pleas of guilty have been entered by the defendant." And
see id. at 15,938 (remarks of Senator Nelson); id. at 16,058 (remarks of Senator Clapp); id.
at 15,825 (remarks of Senator Reed).
20. See sources cited note 19 supra.
21. The uncertainty of the effect of a guilty plea may be illustrated by the following
colloquy on the Senate floor between Senator Walsh, a member of the conference com-
mittee that drafted the proviso, and Senator Reed:
Mr. Walsh. "That is what I wanted to inquire of the Senator [Reed]. He thinks
the term 'consent judgment' would reach to a judgment entered on a plea of guilty?
Mr. Reed. "I think it would .... It is really a judgment by consent.
Mr. Walsh. "I would scarcely give that significance to that language.
Mr. Reed. "It is my opinion, from that language, that the deduction must be
drawn that the exception applies to criminal as well as civil consents. The only way
you can consent in a criminal case is by an absolute plea of guilty....
Mr. Walsh. ". . . I scarcely think the Senator will care to say that judgments
hereafter entered upon a plea of guilty would fall under the discrimination of con-
sent judgments or decrees, because I take it that no criminal would even consent that
a judgment be entered against him when he pleads guilty. The judgment goes as a
matter of course against him.
"... I am not able to agree with the Senator that in the future the judgment en-
tered upon a plea of guilty in a criminal action would not be available under the
proposed statute."
Id. at 15,824-25. Recently several courts, although finding the history of Section 5 vague
and "inconclusive," have resolved the uncertainty by holding that judgments rendered on
guilty pleas are not exempt from the prima fade evidence provision of Section 5. See
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In addition, granting defendants an absolute right to plead nolo
contendere contradicts the primary purpose of Section 5. Section 5 and
other provisions of the Clayton Act were responses to the recommenda-
tions of President Wilson, who had observed that it was "not fair that
the private litigant should be obliged to set up and establish again the
facts which the Government has proved" 22 and had urged Congress to
grant to parties injured by antitrust violations a "right to found their
suits . .. upon the facts and judgments proved and entered in suits
by the Government." 23 In the Clayton Act, Congress gave to private
litigants not only the evidentiary benefit of Government judgments
against the defendants but also several other aids designed to induce
the plaintiffs to sue and to facilitate their action. Section 5 suspended
the statute of limitations for instituting private actions during the
pendency of Government proceedings. 24 Section 12 extended venue
against corporate defendants to any district in which they were
found.25 Prior to 1914 a private litigant could sue a corporate defen-
dant only in the district of which it was an inhabitant. 0 Section 16
granted the private party the additional remedy of a suit for injunctive
relief, which prior to 1914 was available only to the Government.27
The reach of the treble damage action was extended to the Wilson
Tariff Act.28 And Section 4 granted to injured parties the right to sue
General Elec. Co. v. City of San Antonio, 334 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964); City of Burbank
v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1963), cert denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964). Contra,
Northwest Elec. Power Co-Op, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 30 F.R.D. 557 (W.D. Mo. 1961)
(ruling without discussion); Barnsdell Refining Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Corp., 32 F.
Supp. 308 (E.D. Wis. 1940) (dictim); Twin Parts Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 866
(D. Minn. 1939) (dictum); Note, The Admissibility and Scope of Guilty Pleas in Antitrust
Treble Damage Actions, 71 YALE L.J. 684, 688 (1962).
22. 51 CONG. REc. 1964 (1914).
23. Ibid. Wilson also recommended that the statute of limitations on private actions
be suspended during the pendency of a Government antitrust proceeding. Ibid.
24. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964). The effect of this provision
and its substantial benefit to private suitors was dramatically illustrated by the litigation
following United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). In that case
twelve years elapsed between the filing of the Government's action and the entry of final
judgment, and it was held in subsequent cases that the statute of limitations for private
actions was suspended throughout the period. See ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANxITUs'r
REP. 382-83, cases cited note 76 at 383 (1955).
25. 38 Stat. 731 (1914). 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1964).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1914).
27. See Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459 (1917).
28. §§ 73-77, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 570 (1894) (amended by ch. 40, 37 Stat. 667 (1913), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1964)). Section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act declared illegal
agreements between persons engaged in importing goods into the United States if such
agreements are intended to restrain trade or increase prices in the United States. Ibid.
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for treble damages for violations of the "antitrust laws," a generic term
which would allow private actions under subsequently enacted legis-
lation aimed at restraints of trade.29 All of these aids to private litigants
would be undercut by allowing the defendant to escape from private
actions at his will.
Although the evidence and arguments against the "defendant's
right" theory of Section 5 seem convincing and thus support the Gov-
ernment's change of policy in 1953, the evidence does not prove that
the Government has a duty to oppose the acceptance of nolo pleas in
every case. This other extreme position would require a reading of
Section 5 which would be equivalent to giving private parties a right
to a prima facie judgment in treble damage actions and to imposing
upon the Government a duty to procure a judgment for the benefit
of private suitors. This construction of the statute would subvert its
policy by refusing to allow the Government to determine when it
wishes to conserve prosecutorial resources.
Since Section 5 imposes neither of the extreme positions on the
Government, it is free to exercise its discretion in determining when
to oppose and when to acquiesce in a request for consent to plead
nolo contendere. The discretion could be exercised either on an ad hoc
basis or following principled guidelines. In practice the Government
has not advanced any guidelines in individual cases but has assigned
reasons for opposing nolo pleas which might serve as criteria for a con-
sistent position. The following criteria have been considered important:
(1) The seriousness of the violation.30 Per se offenses such as price-
fixing, for example, have been considered serious enough by themselves
to merit opposition to the plea.31 (2) The impact on the economy.32
This criterion has included the nature of the defendants--their prod-
29. In Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958). however, the Supreme
Court adopted a narrow reading of Sections I and 4 of the Clayton Act to exclude Sec-
tion 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1964). as an
antitrust law for violation of which a private treble damage action could be brought.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 76,753 (E.D.
Pa.); United States v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. 80,326 (S.D.N.Y.).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Toledo Milk Distribs. Ass'n, 1954 Trade Cas. 69,958 (N.D.
Ohio); United States v. Burlington Industries, Inc., supra note 30. And see, Address by
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 12.
1961:
Our general policy will be to oppose pleas of nolo contendere by defendants in price-
fixing cases .... Price-fixing is a serious matter.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Ele. Corp., supra note 30 ( The Govern-
ment estimated that over a billion dollars of sales to businesses, government agencies, and
the general public were affected during the conspiracy).
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uct and volume of business-and the victims of the violations. (3) The
flagrance of the violations. The practices engaged in, the manner of
imposing restrictions, elements of wilfulness, fraud, or contempt for
the antitrust laws have all been relevant.3 3 (4) The desire to secure
the benefits of Section 5 for private litigants.8 4 (5) The desire to sub-
ject certain defendants to public censure.35
These criteria, however, have not been employed consistently. In
other cases involving one or more of the considerations relied upon
for opposition in earlier cases, the Government did not oppose the
acceptance of the plea. In United States v. United States Steel Corp.,80
eight of the country's largest steel manufacturers were indicted for
violation of the Sherman Act. The indictment charged the defendants
with participation in a conspiracy consisting of a continuing agree-
ment, during a period of at least six years, to eliminate price compe-
tition in the carbon steel sheet industry,3 7 which represented an esti-
mated annual volume of business of $3.6 billion. The investigation
process lasted nearly two years and cost the Government hundreds of
thousands of dollars. The case was considered among the most impor-
tant of recent antitrust prosecutions; the Government was particularly
interested in establishing price-fixing in order to discredit the theory
that fluctuations in steel prices were the natural by-products of price
33. See, e.g., United States v. Safeway Stores Inc., 20 F.R.D. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1957) (Safe-
way had been convicted of antitrust violations on five prior occasions); United States v.
Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n, 136 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (oppressive manner in
which defendants imposed restrictions on victims); United States v. M. Klahr, Inc., 62 Cr.
347 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), partially reported in 5 TRADE REG. REP. 45,062, at 52,465 (charges
in the indictment indicated moral turpitude-besides price-fixing and bid-rigging there
were allegations of fraud, forging to create semblance of competitive bidding, and destroy-
ing records); United States v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 63 Cr. 110-C (D. Mass. 1964) (Govern-
ment charged the defendant's activities constituted calculated and deliberate contempt
for the Sherman Act).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n, supra note 33, United
States v. Safeway Stores Inc., supra note 33.
35. See, e.g., United States v. American Oil Co., supra note 10; United States v. Union
Plate & Wire Co., 56 Cr. 83F (D. Mass. 1957) (Defendant issued press release stating that
the filing of charges by the Antitrust Division was unwarranted and without legal justi-
fication. The Government considered this as inconsistent with a desire to plead nolo).
36. 64 Cr. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); partially reported in 5 TRADE Ra. REr,. 45,064, at
52,556. See also, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 62 Cr. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) 5 TRADE
REG. REP. 45,062, at 52,469; United States v. United States Steel Corp., 63 Cr. 312 (S.D.
N.Y. 1965) 5 TRADE REG. REP. 45,063, at 52,520.
37. Carbon steel sheet is used in the manufacture of automobile bodies, washing ma-
chines, refrigerators, kitchen cabinets, office furniture and other products. It accounts for
approximately one-third of the total shipments of finished steel mill products In the
United States. Indictment, I Antitrust Pleading File, United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 64 Cr. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
[Vol. 75:845
SECTION 5 AND THE NOLO PLEA
leadership unaffected by agreements among the members of the indus-
try. And, according to a Government attorney, the activities of the
defendants had "one of the greatest impacts [on the economy] in recent
antitrust history."38
Nevertheless, the Government quite unexpectedly acquiesced in the
defendants' tender of nolo contendere pleas, which were promptly
accepted by the court. According to the Government, the case pre-
sented the following "special circumstances" which justified its failure
to protest: (1) acknowledgments by the defendants that they had en-
gaged in some of the activities enumerated in the indictment, (2) the
defendants' discontinuation of the violations prior to the commence-
ment of the grand jury investigation, and (3) the defendants' repre-
sentations that subsequent treble damage actions were unlikely.30
In view of the importance of the case and the magnitude of the vio-
lations it is not easy to accept these reasons as "special circumstances."
The relevance or value of the defendants' qualified acknowledgment40
of participation in some of the activities charged in the indictment is
questionable. When any defendant pleads nolo contendere, by the very
nature of the plea, he admits the facts charged in the indictment for
the purposes of the case and is punished on the basis of that admission.
If the Government's reasoning in Steel were followed, defendants
could create the "special circumstances" necessary to have a nolo plea
accepted simply by pleading nolo. The second reason assigned-the
defendants' allegation that the illegal practices charged had been dis-
continued prior to the grand jury investigation-is no more convinc-
ing. There is nothing unique in discontinuation; it is probably true
of most prosecutions. The seriousness of the violations is in no way
mitigated by the Government's belated investigation. And the third
consideration is equally unconvincing. It is quite curious that the
Government's decision rested upon the defendants' representations
about the unlikelihood of "many" treble damage actions. It seems in-
conceivable that after two years of investigation the Government would
58. Stenographer's Minutes, Hearing before Judge Weinfeld, July 23, 1965. United
States v. United States Steel, 64 Cr. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
39. Ibid.
40. The defendant's acknowledgment read as follows:
While the defendants acknowledge they participated in some of the activities referred
to in the indictment, whether or not these activities constitute a violation of law
would be for the jury ultimately to decide. Such reference to the character of the
meetings is . .. made . . .because a charge of price-fixing may be levied against
many kinds and gradations of conduct. [Emphasis added.]
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Applications for Leave to Plead Nolo Contendere
3, III Antitrust Pleading File, United States v. United States Steel Corp., supra note 37.
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need to be informed by the defendants that private actions were un-
likely. Acceptance of the defendants' forecast of treble damage liability
was proven unrealistic during the sentencing proceedings in the case.
At that time, the Government requested the maximum fine and
brought forth evidence which showed the far reaching impact of the
violations.41 The evidence, briefly put, seemed to contradict the defen-
dants' forecast. This third reason for acquiescing again raises the ques-
tion of the propriety of allowing the defendant to create his own spe-
cial circumstances. Quite aside from accepting defendant's claims
about the likelihood of treble damage action, in other cases the Gov-
ernment has considered the necessity for a clear public record of the
defendant's activities as overriding and has opposed the plea even
though treble damage actions were unlikely.42
In other similarly important prosecutions the Government has un-
expectedly reversed its earlier opposition to the nolo plea, advancing
in support of its reversal criteria which on other occasions it has dis-
missed as improper grounds for accepting the plea. In United States v.
Anaconda American Brass Co.,43 although the Government's attorney
thought the activities of the defendants to constitute "as flagrant a price
fixing conspiracy as I would like to come across," 44 the Government
changed its original position and did not object to the acceptance of
the plea from thirteen out of eighteen defendants. The same attorney
explained to the court that "our reason for assenting to the nolo pleas
is because it disposes [of the case] as well as a conviction in a trial
could do." 45 That statement questions the entire basis of the Govern-
ment's practice of opposing nolo pleas. And in United States v. Bethle.
hem Steel Co.46 the Government reversed its position on the defen-
dants' third request for leave to plead nolo. The Government attorney
explained his new position by stating that acceptance of the plea would
save time and clear the court's calendar. 47 Of course these two reasons
were just as applicable to the defendants' two prior attempts, as they
are applicable to every case. What is more important is that on other
occasions, when the case had some special significance, the Govern-
41. Stenographer's Minutes, Hearing before Judge Weinfeld, supra note 38.
42. See, e.g., United States v. American Oil Co., sura note 10.
43. Cr. No. 10,725 (D. Conn. 1963).
44. Transcript of Proceeding before Judge Blumenfeld, February 11, 1963, United
States v. Anaconda American Brass Co., supra note 43.
45. Ibid.
46. Note 36 supra.
47. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1965, p. 1, col. 2.
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ment has declared that saving time is an improper consideration in
determining whether the plea should be accepted.48
These recent cases illustrate what seems to be an inconsistent appli-
cation of reasons usually given for opposing nolo contendere pleas and
a lack of any established standards used by the Government in its ad-
ministration of the plea. It is quite possible that the Government has
other reasons which would explain the cases.40 As long as the reasons
remain undisclosed, though, it will be impossible to know whether the
Government is still attempting to implement the policy announced
by the Attorney General in 1953. The acquiescence of the Government
in these cases at least invites inquiry. Less visible, yet equally subject
to inquiry, is the position of the Government in the cases in which
it neither opposes nor acquiesces. Unless silence is to be read as acqui-
escence, the Government's position in these cases is impossible to
analyze. It would be preferable for the Government to state its posi-
tion in each case so that critics could determine whether or not it is
applying its criteria consistently, and also to give the courts that rely
on the Government rational guidelines to follow.
THE ATTrITUDES OF THE COURTS
At least in theory the Government's position does not determine
whether or not the nolo plea will be accepted. Rule 11 of the Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure gives the courts, not the Government, dis-
cretion to accept the plea. But the courts have differed on the scope
of this discretion. Three possible views seem to emerge from the cases.
First, Rule 11 may be read as an extremely generous grant of discre-
tion to accept or reject the plea regardless of the Government's posi-
tion.50 Second, Rule 11 may be disregarded by allowing the Govern-
48. See, e.g., United States v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 1957 Trade Cas. 72,871, 72,872 (D.C.).
49. The Government's mysterious conduct in this and companion cases gave risse to
speculation whether they represented an official reversal of the Government's policy with
regard to nolo pleas. In a statement shortly after the disposition of the steel cases on nolo
pleas, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, Donald F.
Turner, declared:
We are in the process of trying to reconsider policy as to when a nolo plea will
be accepted and when it won't.
N.Y. Times, July 28, 1965, p. 1, coL 3. However, Mr. Turner indicated in a letter of
November 5, 1965, to the Yale Law Journal that the Government's position in the steel
cases did not represent any revised policy. It may be significant to note, however, that
the cases came up for disposition during the labor contract negotiations between the steel
industry and workers, that the strike deadline was nearing, and that the President ex-
pressed interest in averting a shutdown.
50. This view appears to be accepted by the many courts which have established in-
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ment complete freedom to decide the issue.5I Finally, a court may take
an intermediate position by allowing the Government freedom, but
using Rule 1l's discretion to ensure that the Government is consistent
and fair.
dependent criteria to override the opposition of the Government in the majority of cases
in which the Government has lodged a protest to nolo pleas. These courts have rested
their decisions principally on their discretion under Rule 11 without adequate examina-
tion of the demands of Section 5 of the Clayton Act. An argument could be made that
Section 5 does not sanction the practice of a court overriding the Government's desire for
full prosecution and that the existence of independent court discretion to accept a nolo
plea under Rule 11 in antitrust cases is inconsistent with the purposes of Section 5, a
consideration probably overlooked by the draftsmen of the Rule. When the Government
opposes a nolo plea it in effect indicates an interest in promoting the policy of the body
of Section 5 by securing a judgment to assist private suitors. It also indicates a choice
not to spare its resources in the particular case. The reading of the proviso as a tool for
the Government to minimize its antitrust litigation burden would require the Govern-
ment to exercise full control over application of the proviso. Hence it could not be up
to the defendants nor up to the courts to decide unilaterally when the Government
should be relieved of a prosecution, especially one that it wishes to litigate fully. And
the impracticality of allowing independent court discretion over the application of the
proviso is illustrated by the inevitable one-sidedness of that discretion. Full discretion
would entail power to override the Government even when it does not want to prosecute
fully, i.e., when it acquiesces in the offer of a nolo plea or when it actually suggests to
the court that the plea be accepted. In practice that does not occur; the courts have
acted independently only to override an objection. Overriding a suggestion for acceptance
would be extraordinary. When the Government registers no opposition, there is little
that the courts can do to override that discretion, especially in view of the fact that the
decision is departmental rather than that of a single prosecutor. The courts could not
compel the Government to prosecute fully; if they reject the Government's suggestion to
accept a nolo plea, the Government can drop the prosecution if it wishes not to proceed.
Moreover, the Government's decision not to proceed fully may be based upon national
policy considerations that a court may not be aware of unless it compels their disclosure.
This the courts would be reluctant to do, just as the Government may occasionally prefer
not to reveal the real reasons underlying its decision.
51. Some courts have recognized their limitations in this area, and have deferred to
the Government's determination in spite of their own inclinations to the contrary. See,
e.g., United States v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 5 TRADE REo. REP. (1966 Trade
Cas.) $ 71,649 (E.D. Ill.). A few courts have endeavored to establish independent standards
to reject nolo contendere pleas. These courts sometimes express hostility towards nolo
contendere pleas. See, e.g., United States v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 1957 Trade Cas.
73,327, at 73,328 (W.D. Va.) (The court expressed a "general disinclination to accept
pleas of nolo contendere for the reasons that it thought they were in the nature of 'face-
saving' pleas and were tendered because the defendants did not wish to bear the supposed
odium of pleading guilty, although they might in fact be guilty of the offense charged
and know that they were guilty.') They also generally assert that they require a positive
showing by the defendants of circumstances entitling them to the benefits of the nolo
plea. See, e.g., United States v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., supra, at 73,328; United States
v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The most essential
factor considered by these courts is whether the public interest will be better served by
acceptance or rejection of the plea. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Ultramarine &
Color Co., supra; United States v. McDonough Co., 1960 Trade Gas. 76,737 (S.D. Ohio).
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Regardless of which position the courts have, in fact, adopted there
seems to be striking uniformity in outcome. Statistics indicate that
the courts have been overwhelmingly sympathetic to nolo contendere
pleas. Between 1935 and 1950 nolo pleas were allowed in 181 antitrust
prosecutions and rejected in none.r,2 Between 1954 and 1964 the plea
was accepted from some or all defendants in 167 casesro and refused in
One court cited the following criteria as important in this determination: (1) the nature
of the violation-how serious, the length of time engaged in, the practices involved, and
the extent of the defendant's participation; (2) the nature of the defendant-its size and
power in the industry, the importance of the product, and the record of prior violations;
(3) the impact of the violations on the economy; (4) the deterrent effect resulting from
acceptance or rejection; and (5) the position of the Government. United States v. Stan-
dard Ultramarine & Color Co., supra at 172. Other courts have assigned one or more of
these reasons in rejecting nolo pleas. See, e.g., United States v. Toledo Milk Distribs. Ass'n,
1954 Trade Cas. 69,988 (N.D. Ohio) (price-fixing in vital industry); United States v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 76,753 (E.D. Pa.) (court influenced greatly by the
position of the Government).
Close observation reveals, however, that in the cases in which the plea has been re-
jected the Government's protest has been the decisive factor and that the arguments
countenanced by the courts in denying the plea have in fact been those advanced by
the Government. No case is known in which a nolo plea has been refused in the absence
of Government protest or against the Government's suggestion that it be accepted. That
result is not surprising. The determination of whether the public would be better served
by a rejection of a nolo plea is a policy decision which the Government is more com-
petent to make. It has the pertinent data concerning the offense and the offenders from
which it can assess the impact of full prosecution from a national perspective. Since the
Government's decision to contest a nolo plea theoretically is based on the same public
interest consideration, the court would merely echo the Government's determination if it
rejects a plea which the Government has opposed. If, on the other hand, the Govern-
ment indicates that the case should be disposed of by a nolo plea, the courts' "indepen-
dent" standards are undercut. If the court disagrees, it would have to make a contrary
policy determination. The court would also have to make the unusual decision to tell the
Government to proceed with a case that the Government may prefer not to prosecute
fully. This the courts have felt constrained to do. Instead, some courts have taken the
absence of Government remonstrance to a nolo plea as itself indicating that the public
interest will be sufficiently vindicated if the plea is accepted. See, e.g., United States v.
Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., supra at 81,904, where the court declared:
In view of the statements of counsel for the government made both orally and in
written briefs and in view of the interpretation that the Court places on the govern-
ment's position in not opposing such a plea that no public harm would ensue in
accepting the nolo contendere plea and in spite of this Court's disfavor of such a plea,
I did accept the plea of nolo contendere of this defendant.
Thus these courts in effect acknowledge that their discretion to accept nolo contendere
pleas in antitrust cases is circumscribed by the position taken by the Government.
52. See Yankwich, Observations on Anti-Trust Procedures, 10 F.R.D. 165, 166 (1951).
and United States v. Westinghouse Corp., 1960 Trade Cas., supra note 51, at 76,756 (argu-
ment of defense counsel).
53. Brief in Support of Defendants' Entry of Nolo Contendere Pleas, I Antitrust Plead.
ing File, United States v. American Oil Co., 65 Cr. 150(3) (ED. Mo. 1965). The criminal
cases disposed of between July, 1955 and 1962 break down as follows:
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only 25. 54 The figures are more impressive if put in terms of the num-
ber of defendants allowed to enter nolo pleas. During the period 1956
to 1964 nolo pleas were accepted from 916 out of the 1130 (81%)
defendants convicted and sentenced in connection with federal anti-
trust violations. 5 Even Government opposition to the plea has not
significantly deterred court acceptance. Between 1954 and 1964 the
courts allowed nolo pleas over the objection of the Government in 99
of the 124 contested motions. 0
A study of the latter group of cases might indicate why the courts
Nolo Contendere as to all defendants
Nolo Contendere as to some defendants
Guilty pleas as to all defendants
Guilty pleas as to some defendants







Criminal cases actually tried as to some defendants 6
Total 15
54. Disposition of Antitrust Cases Where the Government Opposed Entry of Nolo
Contendere Pleas, 1954 to August 1964, I Antitrust Pleading File, United States v. H. P.
Hood & Sons, Inc., 63 Cr. 110-c (D. Mass. 1964).
55. The breakdown was as follows:
DEFENDANTS CONVICTED AND SENTENCED
Plea Plea
Guilty, Plea Nolo, Convicted
Initial Nolo Initial by
Fiscal Plea Plea Not Conten- Plea Not
Year Total Guilty Guilty dere Guilty Court Jury
1964 143 2 6 51 78 3 3
1963 118 1 5 42 70 - -
1962 69 2 - 22 31 13 1
1961 153 9 48 25 58 - 13
1960 106 - - 12 91 3 -
1959 133 1 10 31 81 6 4
1958 144 - 1 13 100 10 20
1957 100 9 15 41 28 1 6
1956 164 5 11 33 109 4 2
Total 1130 29 96 270 646 40 49
This table was obtained from the Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics, Adminis-
trative Office of United States Courts.
56. Disposition of Antitrust Cases Where the Government Opposed Entry of Nolo
Contendere Pleas, note 54 supra.
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have seemed so receptive to nolo pleas. In accepting the plea over pro-
test by the Government the courts usually rest their decisions on (1)
the policy of the proviso to Section 5, (2) reasons of judicial adminis-
tration, and (3) special circumstances present in the individual case.
Section 5 Arguments. Many courts purport to find the endorsement
of congressional policy to support their decision to allow nolo con-
tendere pleas. They stress that in the proviso to Section 5 Congress
intended to favor defendants who accept the invitation to capitulate
without trial, and that disposal of cases by nolo pleas is consonant
with that declared position.57 As a corollary to this argument, some
courts maintain that the responsibility of the government to vindicate
the public interest does not extend to securing judgments that could
be utilized by private litigants. According to one court, for example,
Congress did not intend that "pleas of nolo contendere be refused in
criminal antitrust cases for the purpose of aiding private litigants un-
der Section 5 of the Clayton Act."58s
In essence, and occasionally in fact, these courts have construed the
proviso as conferring upon the antitrust defendant an "unqualified
right to capitulate," 59 or as containing implicitly a congressional com-
mand to favor those defendants who surrender. As shown earlier,c
this reading is not reasonable, especially when the Government, by
opposing the plea, expresses its readiness to go to trial and to use its
prosecutorial resources. The corollary argument against the Govern-
ment's attempt to procure a prima facie judgment for private suitors
is equally unsatisfactory, and like the core argument reads the proviso
57. Although the courts generally recognize that private treble damage suits by those
who have been injured by antitrust violations have the effect of making the antitrust
laws more effective, there is to be found in the section quoted an unmistakable intent
on the part of Congress to say to the law violators that, if they will capitulate by a
consent decree before any testimony has been taken, then the provision as to the
judgment in favor of the Government being prima fade evidence in private litigation
will not apply.
Tnited States v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 1963 Trade Cas. 78,494, at 78,495
). Minn.). See United States v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 1957 Trade Cas. 72,871 (D. Colo.).
58. United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc, 20 F.R.D. 451, 457 (N.D. Tem. 1957). But see
sited States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Brunswvick-Balke-Collender Co., 203 F. Supp. 657, 662
D. Wis. 1962) ("The right given to antitrust defendants by the proviso of § 5 to avoid
'prima fade evidence' sanction by capitulation is an unqualified right.'); United States
Vard Baking Co., 1963 Trade Cas. 77,499 (M.D. Fla.), vacated and remanded, 376 U.S.
(1964). But see Dabney, Consent Decrees Without Consent, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1053,
.63 (1963).
, See text accompanying notes 16-30 supra.
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in a vacuum. It is not true that Section 5 prevents the Government
from seeking to ease the burden of potential treble damage plaintiffs.
Congressional efforts to facilitate private antitrust actions by making
Government judgments available to private suitors would be undercut
if the Government did not exert itself to secure the judgments upon
which the success of the private enforcement scheme rests. The courts
which have correctly thought it necessary to justify the exercise of
their discretion under Rule 11 in terms of Section 5 have incorrectly
focused their attention on the proviso alone. To discount the Govern-
ment's efforts on behalf of a private plaintiff is as unsatisfactory as
to overlook Section 5 altogether.
Judicial Administration. The courts which have relied upon argu-
ments concerning judicial administration to override Government
opposition to nolo pleas seem, in fact, to have ignored Section 5. These
arguments have usually been based upon a desire to expedite litigation,
presumably because the public interest so compels. Although the courts
consistently claim that the condition of the dockets and saving time
can never justify accepting the plea, in numerous cases they have left
no doubt that judicial economy has been a decisive factor in the
acceptance of nolo pleas.61 Thus, in United States v. B. F. Goodrich
Co.62 the court noted that it would allow nolo pleas only upon a show-
ing by the defendants of "exceptional circumstances." The only excep-
tional circumstance alleged by the defendants was the possibility of
exposure to greater treble damage liability. The court met this sur-
prisingly candid admission with the argument that if the desire to be
shielded from potential treble damage liability constituted an "excep-
tional circumstance" it would exist in almost every Sherman Act
prosecution. Nonetheless, the court granted the defendants' motion
61. See, e.g.. United States v. Burlington Indus., 1965 Trade Cas. 80,618 (S.D.NY.);
United States v. Milk Distribs. Ass'n, Inc., Crim. No. 25658 (W.D. Md. 1962); United
States v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 1957 Trade Gas. 72,871 (D. Colo.); United States v. Safeway
Stores, 20 F.R.D. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1957). In the latter case, the court expressed this view
as follows:
While the condition of the Court's docket would not be reason for the acceptance of
the pleas of nolo contendere, the fact is that all other litigation in the Fort Worth,
Abilene and San Angelo Divisions of the Northern District of Texas would necessarily
be delayed and all other litigants would be denied the right to speedy trial during
the trial of this case, estimated at a minimum of three months, if such pleas be not
accepted. The benefits to be derived from a long, expensive trial are not sufficient in
the instant case to justify the rejection of the defendants' offered pleas of nolo con,
tendere. The saving of time and expense has been recognized as a factor in the ac
ceptance of pleas of nolo contendere.
Id. at 458.
62. 1957 Trade Cas. 72,871 (D. Colo.).
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because
the public interest requires that everything be done which can
properly be done to expedite the trial and disposition of lawsuits.
In this case a lengthy trial is prophesied. The elimination of such
a trial will make available court time for the handling of other
litigation which has been long delayed.0
The court added that although congestion of the court's calendar is
not a controlling reason for granting consent to a nolo plea, "it is a
factor which a trial judge may not blithely ignore."0 4 Thus, the court
created its own "exceptional circumstance," which was no more satis-
factory than the one offered by the defendants.
It is understandable for the courts in exercising their discretion to
concern themselves with the drain on their time and energy and with
access to the courts by other litigants. But there is little justification
for sacrificing one class of plaintiffs. Why should the court choose be-
tween antitrust plaintiffs and plaintiffs in tort, contract, or divorce
actions? In addition, the reason assigned by the courts for their posi-
tion-the public interest in uncluttered dockets-is hardly sufficient.
Freeing the docket can benefit only the defendants in the particular
antitrust case and the small segment of the public which may then be
engaged in litigation. The larger public interest in effective adminis-
tration of the antitrust laws certainly deserves greater consideration.
In some cases a decisive factor relied upon by the courts has been
the pendency of a companion Government civil action based on the
same facts as the criminal proceeding 5 Courts facing this situation
have said that "[It would be an unconscionable waste of the man-
power of this court and of the litigants to have two protracted trials
involving substantially the same proof."00 Some courts add the obser-
vation that the judgment rendered in the civil action will be available
to private litigants as prima facie evidence, thus replacing the benefit
63. Id. at 72,878. The court had requested that the matter of the congestion of the
court's docket be brought to the attention of the Attorney General, who later conveyed
"'a very sympathetic concern" for the congestion of the calendar but felt that this was not
a factor to be considered in the decision on a nolo plea. Id. at 72,872. The defense coun-
sel then quite shrewdly reminded the court that ". . . the discretion is not Mr. Brownell's
[Attorney General] or Mr. Hansen's [Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division] %who
sit in air-conditioned offices in washington but it is yours who sits [sic] behind the bench
in an un-air-conditioned courtroom here." Id. at 72,873.
64. Id. at 72,876.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Burlington Indus., 1965 Trade Cas. 80,613 (S.D.N.Y.);
United States v. Burlington Indus., 1964 Trade Cas. 80,326 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v.
Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n, 136 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
66. United States v. Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n, supra note 65, at 213.
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lost when the defendant pleads nolo in the criminal case.07 The short-
hand version, in the words of one court, is: ".... [A] judgment in one
action would thus accomplish the same result as a judgment in two."081
Unfortunately, the courts and private litigants cannot be accommodated
so easily.
The argument does not take into account that in practice Govern-
ment civil antitrust actions are usually settled out of court by consent
decrees, 69 which are immune from the effects of Section 5. By accepting
the nolo plea of a defendant confronted with simultaneous Govern-
ment civil and criminal actions the court affords that defendant a great
tactical advantage. If the nolo plea is accepted before the disposition
of the civil action, defendant can come to terms on a consent decree
in the civil suit, thereby avoiding the effects of Section 5 in both pro-
ceedings. It may be argued that the Government can always refuse to
consent to the civil decree and insist upon a trial for the purpose of
securing a judgment for the benefit of private parties. But there are
indications that the courts will not view this strategy favorably.70 In
67. See, e.g., United States v. Burlington Indus.. 1965 Trade Cas. 80,613 (S.D.N.Y.);
United States v. Burlington Indus., 1964 Trade Cas. 80,326 (S.D.N.Y.). In the former case
the court declared: "I do not believe it is in the public interest to burden the criminal
calendar of this court for the benefit of private litigants who will receive all the benefits
which the law may have intended to grant them .. " 1965 Trade Cas. at 80,615.
68. United States v. Burlington Indus., 1964 Trade Cas. 80,326, at 80,327 (S.D.N.Y.).
The courts cannot make these sweeping statements about the effect of the judgment in
the Government's civil action without first examining the nature of that civil action. If
the Government's civil proceeding is one for damages alone under § 4A of the Clayton
Act, the courts would be totally wrong in asserting that the benefits of a prima facie
judgment would be preserved. Under the proviso as amended by the Act of July 7, 1955,
69 Stat. 282, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1964), judgments entered in proceedings brought by the
Government under § 4A are exempt from the prima facie evidence effect of the body of
§ 5. If the Government's civil action is for injunctive relief alone, a judgment entered
after trial would be available to private litigants as prima fade evidence. If the Govern-
ment action is simultaneously for damages and injunctive relief, however, the statute is
silent.
69. In the three year period 1962-1964, for example, the Government terminated 117
civil cases. Of these, 92, or 79% of the total, were concluded by consent decrees. Letter
to the Yale Law Journal from the Administrative Office of United States Courts, October
14, 1965, on file in the Yale Law Library. The breakdown is as follows:
1962 1963 1964
Civil Cases Terminated 14 65 38
Civil Cases Terminated by Consent 11 51 30
70. See, e.g., United States v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 203 F. Supp. 657, 661
(E.D. Wis. 1962): "We do not believe that anything in § 5 . . . requires or authorizes
the Government to continue to prosecute litigation where the only remaining purpose
of the continued prosecution is the establishment of certain benefits for treble damage
claimants."
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United States v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.-- a nolo plea was ac-
cepted in the parallel criminal action, a consent decree had been nego-
tiated in the civil case, and the defendant had acceded to its terms.
The Government, however, had not formally given consent. While
the litigation was pending the Government instituted a policy which
required, as a condition to its grant of consent to a decree, that the
defendant agree to concede guilt in treble damage actions by certain
claimants.7 2 The Government thus sought to overcome the operation
of the proviso to Section 5. But the defendant moved for a judgment
without the condition demanded. The Government argued that it had
a right to refuse consent and insist upon a trial even though the defen-
dant had agreed to all the relief which the Government could obtain
at trial. The court rejected this argument and entered a consent decree
without the Government's consent. 73
Courts that rely on parallel civil actions when accepting nolo pleas
also gloss over the essential differences between the two methods of
redressing injuries and ignore the objectives that prompt the Govern-
ment to initiate two proceedings. The civil action is brought to secure
an order enjoining the defendant from further participation in the
proscribed conduct and also to obtain past damages for any injury
suffered by the Government as a consumer. But when the Government
initiates a criminal proceeding, it seeks more than prohibitory and
compensatory remedies; it seeks the additional sanctions of fines, pos-
sible jail sentences and social stigma, none of which is provided by
the civil action.
71. 203 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
72. The Government attempted to preserve the benefits of § 5 in any suit brought
against the defendants by a state or political subdivision. Ibid.
73. The same strategy was involved in United States v. Lake Asphalt & Petroleum
Co., 1960 Trade Cas. 77,271 (D. Mass.), discussed in Dabney, Consent Decrees Without
Consent, 63 COLUmi. L. REV. 1053, 1058 (1963). Some of the defendants refused to accede
to the waiver provision demanded by the Government and requested a judgment without
it. The court denied the motion for judgment and ordered the case for trial. However.
the judge declared that although he was "willing to believe that the court had power"
to grant the motion, he declined to exercise it as a matter of discretion. Dabney, supra
at 1058.
In United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327 (1964), the Supreme Court declined
to rule on the question whether the Government may properly refuse consent to a decree
and insist upon a trial in cases where there is complete agreement on every substantive
item of relief. The Court held that a consent judgment could not be rendered without
the Government's consent if there existed a genuine controversy about an item of relief
to which the Government may show at trial that it is entitled. In this case the Govern-
ment's refusal to consent was based not on an attempt to by-pass the proviso to § 5 for
the benefit of private litigants but on a desire to obtain broader injunctive relief than
the defendants were willing to accept.
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If the nolo plea is rejected, and it becomes necessary to adjudicate
both the civil and the criminal actions, the courts' fear of extensive
relitigation of the same issues is overstated. By application of the prin-
ciples of collateral estoppel the issues actually raised and determined
in a prior action are established conclusively between the same parties
and cannot be relitigated subsequently.7 4 Under the Supreme Court's
ruling in Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,75 these prin-
ciples of estoppel have been found in Section 5, which permits the
Government, in its civil action, to introduce as prima facie evidence
of violation the judgment entered in the companion criminal pro-
ceeding. The estoppel, as defined by the Court, extends to "all matters
of fact and law necessarily decided by the conviction and the verdict
on which it was based." 76 Moreover, the disposition of the second case
may be expedited in some instances by the rules of evidence, particu-
larly those relating to admissions. 77
Finally, acceptance of a nolo plea simply to avoid the duplication
of a criminal trial and a civil trial presupposes that the defendant
who cannot plead nolo will invariably plead not guilty and force the
Government to trial. But the defendant may himself wish to avert a
trial. Of the 25 cases recorded between 1954 and 1964 in which the
courts refused nolo pleas, the defendants subsequently pleaded guilty
in at least 15.78
Special Circumstances. In numerous cases the presence of special
circumstances peculiar to the particular case has been relied upon by
the courts in accepting the nolo plea over the Government's protest.
Circumstances such as the alleged good faith of the defendant, his
willingness to submit to and cooperate with the Government,0 his
74. See Local 167, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 298 (1934):
United States v. Greater New York Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce, 53 F.2d 518
(S.D.N.Y. 1931). And see generally Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HAav. L.
REv. 1 (1942).
75. 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
76. Id. at 569.
77. The making of judicial admissions by defense counsel in Government antitrust
proceedings has been cited as one of the chief "pitfalls" for a defendant who may subse-
quently have to defend private actions. Seeley, The Pitfalls Which Lurk in Government
Litigation for Defendants Who May Be Subjected to Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTRraUsr
BuLL. 17 (1959).
78. This figure was obtained by scanning the Antitrust Pleading File of each of the
25 cases in which the nolo contendere plea was rejected.
Of course, guilty pleas will encourage rather than discourage private actions. So It
would be of no comfort to a court to reject a nolo plea and invite a guilty plea along
with an increased amount of private litigation.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 1963 Trade Cas.
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inadvertence or lack of intention in committing the offense, 0 his rela-
tively minor role in the violation,8' the absence of a previous record
of convictions or violations,8 2 and the prior grant of consent to plead
nolo to other defendants in the same case83 have been cited and held
to constitute special circumstances.
The existence of special circumstances may in proper cases be justi-
fied as a consideration to be weighed in a ruling on a nolo plea. How-
ever, the courts have at times overemphasized the importance of miti-
gating circumstances and, by relying on them to accept nolo pleas, have
overlooked the demands of Section 5.84 In cases of serious violations
78,494 (D. Minn.). The defendants alleged that they had shown good faith by terminating
the unlawful practices prior to the commencement of any Government investigation and
offered to submit to a consent decree in the Government's civil case.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 1957 Trade Cas. 73.327 (W.D.
Va.). The court did not accept the plea because the defendants did not make out an
adequate showing that the case was a proper one for disposal by nolo contendere. But
it permitted the defendants to renew the motions, noting that the plea would be accepted
where the facts showed an inadvertent violation or one not accompanied by wrongful
intent.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Engelhard-Hanovia, Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. 79.161 (S.D.
N.Y.). Defendant's participation in the violation was of a shorter duration and of a
lesser degree than that of the other defendants. And defendant's share of the industry's
gross sales amounted to approximately 3%, as opposed to 48%. 217 and 20c% for other
defendants.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Burlington Indus., 1964 Trade Cas. 80,326 (S.D.N.Y.)
(Defendant, in business for over sixty years, had never before been charged with a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws.); United States v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 1963
Trade Cas. 78,494 (D. Minn.).
83. In United States v. Blaw-Knox Corp., 63 Cr. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), one defendant was
permitted to enter a nolo plea which the Government did not oppose. Subsequently a
second defendant requested leave to plead nolo contendere. The Government objected.
but the plea was allowed when no sufficient showing was made for the difference in
treatment of the defendants. Nolo pleas were thereafter accepted from the remaining de-
fendants for the same reason. In United States v. Burlington Indus., 1965 Trade Cas.
80,613 (S.D.N.Y.), this practice was carried one step further. One defendant had been
allowed to plead nolo but, unlike the Blaw-Knox case, over the vigorous protest of the
Government. Later five other defendants applied to a different judge for consent to enter
nolo contendere pleas. Among other things, the court declared that it was in agreement
with the result in Blaw-Knox in accepting the plea on the ground that another defendant
in the same case had previously been allowed to enter a nolo plea.
84. In United States v. Burlington Indus., supra note 83, the defendants were charged
with a serious price-fixing conspiracy in glass fiber industrial fabrics, a product which the
Government alleged was essential to the national defense. As a result of the conspiracy.
the Government also alleged, defense costs were increased and substantial private injury
was caused. To the Government's charges regarding the seriousness of the violation, the
court answered: "Recognizing the gravity of the offense, is this sufficient grounds, in itself,
to warrant denial of the plea? I think not." Id. at 80,615. The court accepted the plea
relying heavily on the special circumstance of a government civil action against the
defendants for the same offense.
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where substantial private injury has resulted, the policy of Section 5
should override any special considerations that would deny the evi-
dentiary aid to injured parties and permit defendants to avoid private
liability. The court may always rely on the special circumstances to
mitigate the punishment it may impose upon conviction.
None of these justifications for accepting nolo pleas over the Gov-
ernment's objection is satisfactory. The consistent practice of accepting
nolo pleas requires that we inquire further into the courts' motiva-
tions.
One possible explanation may be found in the views of some com-
mentators who have observed that some trial courts harbor an attitude
of "definite hostility" toward the treble damage action.85 This attitude
can be traced to the belief that triple damages by private litigants is
a drastic, extraordinary remedy that should be restricted.80 Two ele-
85. See Statement of Lee Loevinger, Hearings on the Role of Private Antitrust En-
forcement in Protecting Small Business Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Small Business, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1958): "In interpretation of law and
requirements of proof, the courts are considerably more rigorous when the suit is brought
by a private individual than when they are brought by the Government." See also, State-
ment of Jerrold G. Van Cise, Hearings on H.R. 4597 Before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1954); Bicks, The Department of
Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTrrRnusT BuLL. 13-14 (1959); W. HAMILTON
& I. TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION, 83 (TNEC Monograph 16, 1940): "In general the courts
have looked upon suits for triple damages with such disfavor that the statutory presump-
tion in favor of the plaintiff is rather lightly entertained and the rebuttal rather gen-
erally indulged."
86. The right which the said Acts give to a person to recover three-fold the damages
he has sustained, is an unusual one, the remedy is drastic, and the Acts are to be
strictly construed and not to be enlarged by construction.
Westor Theatres v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 41 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D.N.J. 1941); see also
Allgair v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 91 F. Supp. 93, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1950): "The extraordinary
remedy of triple damages . . . requires the closest scrutiny of the transaction which is
the subject of suit .. " This attitude may have been manifested in the limitations placed
on recovery through the rigorous standards of pleading and proof that have been Im-
posed on private litigants. In former practice, courts were able to regulate treble damage
actions by a stringent requirement of proof of damages that barred as "speculative" any
inferential allegation of injury. See Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties:
Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YAmx L.J. 1010, 1025 n.96 and
accompanying text (1952). The courts also held the plaintiffs to a strict requirement of
direct causal relation between the alleged violation and his loss of business. Id. at 1017
n.46 and accompanying text. The courts have exercised strict control over the treble dam-
age action in yet another way. The plaintiff must show that his claim "is affected with
[an] invasion of the public interest." Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib.
Corp., 140 F. Supp. 686, 699 (D. Neb. 1955). Thus the plaintiff cannot recover unless lie
satisfies the court that there has not only been a violation and he has sustained damages
but also that "public rights have also been violated." Id. at 695. The record of plaintiffs'
victories in private actions has also been cited as evidence of judicial hostility. Despite the
great liberalization in the rules of pleading, discovery, and proof of damages, and despite
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ments probably contribute to the characterization of treble damage
relief as drastic. Because of uncertainty and fluctuations in the prac-
tices forbidden by the antitrust laws, some courts may feel that expos-
ing antitrust defendants to treble damage liability constitutes a punish-
ment greater than the violation deserves.87 And some may feel that
punishment should be imposed by courts alone in a fixed and deter-
minable amount. At least one court has given weight to these con-
siderations:
When this Court imposes the penalties they are definite. If,
however, treble damages should be recovered, the overall result
might be more severe than this Court considered the defendants
deserved. If the spectre of treble damage suits is eliminated, the
Court can impose the exact punishment that this Court deems
appropriate.s8
In addition to the belief that the treble damage penalty is unduly
harsh, other reasons may explain judicial hostility to private suits.
The potential windfall of treble damages probably induces some plain-
tiffs to initiate sham suits. These plaintiffs rely on the fact of a
Government conviction alone to press for a settlement of some sort.
Other private actions may be the result of competitive antagonism or
the last swing of a failing company. Some commentators have pointed
to a dlass of lawyers who specialize in promoting such claims.69 The
defendants' response is delay-to exhaust the plaintiffs' resources and
thereby force the least expensive settlement or abandonment of the
litigation.90 In the meantime, the courts would have to bear the burden
of dilatory motions from plaintiffs as well as defendants. If a private
congressional solicitude towards private antitrust actions, plaintiffs won only 20 of the
144 treble damage actions litigated from 1952 to 1958. Bicks, supra note 85, at 11. For a
slightly higher estimate see Testimony of Victor Hansen, Hearings on the Role of Private
Enforcement, supra note 84, at 129. During the same period the Government won 31 and
lost 39 cases after trial. Bicks, supra at 12. On the other hand, plaintiffs suing solely for
injunctive relief won 8 out of 17 cases, a record of almost 50% victory as compared to
the 14% in damage actions. Id. at 11.
87. See Statement of Hammond E. Chaffetz, Hearings on H.R. 4597, supra note 85,
at 16.
88. United States v. Milk Distrib. Ass'n, Crim. No. 25658 (D. Md. 1962), Transcript of
Proceedings 2 (February 12, 1962).
89. See Comment, supra note 86, at 1062 n.335.
90. For some colorful anecdotes of abuse and delay in antitrust litigation see Statement
of Walton Hamilton, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 285 (1949). According to
Hamilton, techniques of delay "have been elaborated into a fine art, and that fine art is
now very well established." Id. at 291. See also Comment, Tactical Use and Abuse of
Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 Ymxr L.J. 117 (1949).
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action does go to trial a court will be faced with the complex issues
usually involved in very time-consuming antitrust proceedings. In
addition, a court may be compelled to work with juries that, as a result
of plaintiffs' peremptory challenges, lack the sophistication and learning
necessary to understand the technical evidence normally adduced by
antitrust defendants to disprove involvement in illegal activity. Some
courts may feel that such juries tend to return irrational verdicts. It
is not surprising, therefore, that antitrust actions may be "a burden, if
not a bore, to a busy, overworked court." 91 The possible reasons sug-
gested may have prompted the observation of one prominent judge,
Charles E. Clark, who noted "a developing trend in some of our trial
courts of hostility toward the 'big' antitrust case and of discovering
obstacles-going even back to matters of pleading and pre-trial-
in the way of a free showing of the need of remedial relief."' 2 If these
observations are valid, there is reason to believe that the judicial
antipathy towards antitrust actions coupled with hostility towards
treble damages may result in the use of the nolo contendere plea as
a means of escaping the trial of criminal antitrust suits and also the
civil suits which might follow a judgment that may be discouraged by
the absence of a judgment for the Government entered after trial.
The preceding analysis of the administration of the nolo plea by
the Government and the courts illustrates the lack of rational and
consistently applied standards. There appear to be considerations be-
neath the surface which determine how the Government and the
courts act in this area. The record also seems to show no continuous
commitment to the Sherman and Clayton Acts' conception of the pri-
vate plaintiff as a coordinate agent for antitrust enforcement. If the
litigated cases are a reliable indicator, the Government and the courts
have not helped the private party very much. The record of nolo ad-
ministration, however, has not escaped congressional attention, and
measures have been introduced which would alter prior practice.
CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS
In 1963 Congressman Celler observed that it had become "common-
place for the courts to override the Government's objections and accept
nolo pleas," 93 and he introduced a bill0 4 designed to stop the practice.
91. Eagle Lion Studios, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 248 F.2d 438, 451 (2d Cir. 1957) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
92. Ibid.
93. 109 CONG. REc. 16,049 (1963).
94. H.R. 8253, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reproduced at 109 CONG. REc. 16,050 (1963)
and discussed in Comment, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 518 (1964).
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His bill would amend the proviso to Section 5 by adding to it: "The
term 'consent judgments' as used herein shall not include judgments
of conviction based... upon a plea of nolo contendere which has been
accepted over the objection of the United States."05 By giving private
litigants the benefit of a judgment entered after a contested nolo plea
was accepted, Celler's approach would allow the Government, regard-
less of the attitudes of courts, to assist private suitors. Whether his
amendment would improve the position of private litigants would
depend upon the Government's policy regarding opposition to nolo
pleas and the courts' reaction in subsequent treble damage actions.
Celler appears not to have accounted for these considerations.
A more recent Congressional response was provoked by the Govern-
ment's position in the steel cases. 0 Senator Hart introduced a bill07
which would make all judgments entered upon nolo pleas, even when
the Government does not protest, prima facie evidence against the
defendants in subsequent private actions. Hart's bill thus echoes
Celler's criticism of the courts but, unlike Celler's bill, would make
it impossible for the Government to control the operation of the
proviso.
Both proposals properly express a concern over the judicial ad-
ministration of nolo pleas. And they also share a desire to strengthen
the role of private litigants in antitrust enforcement. But both are
hasty responses that do not account for all the relevant considerations
which may underlie the problem. Before Congress acts in this area,
there are some fundamental questions that should be explored.
Assuming that Congress wants to continue to use private enforcement
it must first determine the efficacy of the private litigants' role under
present conditions. Although the statistics of litigated cases0" suggest
95. 109 CONG. REc. 16,050 (1963). Celler's proposal would also exempt guilty pleas from
the operation of the proviso, thus codifying the decisions of the courts that have so held.
See cases cited note 11 supra.
96. See 111 CONG. RIEc. 22,516-17 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1965) (remarks of Senator Hart).
97. S. 2512, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965). The pertinent section of the Hart bill provides
as follows:
A final judgment ... rendered in a civil or criminal proceeding brought by . . .
the United States, under any provision of the antitrust laws other than section 4A
of this Act, to the effect that a defendant has violated said provision shall be--
(2) prima fade evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought
by any other party against such defendant under said laws ... if such final judg-
ment or decree was entered before the commencement of the taking of testimony in
a criminal proceeding.
The first part of the bill would give judgments conclusive effect if entered after trial.
98. See note 86 supra.
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that private litigants are not very effective, these statistics may not be
an accurate gauge. The statistics on litigated cases may represent only
a fraction of the total private antitrust activity. They do not encom-
pass the number of cases which are settled out of court before or after
the commencement of the suit. A proper index of the success of private
enforcement, therefore, must consider whether the bulk of plaintiffs
with bona fide claims redress their injuries by adequate settlements out
of court. It may be that strong cases against defendants are settled out
of court, and only the weak cases are litigated. This practice would ex-
plain the poor record of private parties in litigated cases.
If, however, the major portion of private enforcement is represented
by litigated cases, the focus of inquiry should be on the full range of
explanations for the prior administration of pleas. Some of the factors
which motivate decisions in this area may not be known fully even to
the courts and the Government. But Congress must learn the reasons
for the past performance if it is to legislate intelligently. A solution
for each possible reason should be considered. If, for example, the
courts' distaste for treble damages is a substantial handicap to the plain-
tiff,90 treble damages might be replaced by an action for actual dam.
ages.100 A greater opportunity to win actual damages might induce as
99. See Statement of Jerrold G. Van Cise, Hearings on H.R. 4597, supra note 85, at
26:
[O]ne of the greatest handicaps, if not the greatest, of a plaintiff in a treble.damage
action is the treble-damage part of the litigation ...
Much of the difficulties experienced over the years by plaintiffs in these actions
is believed to stem from a reluctance of juror and judge to make punitive trebled
awards in doubtful cases.
100. The suggestion of eliminating mandatory treble damages has been made before.
See, e.g., H.R. 4597, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1954), which would leave the amount of recovery,
not to exceed trebled recovery, to the discretion of the court. Hearing on H.R. 4597
Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1954). This proposal was adopted by the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws, which reported:
On balance, we favor vesting in the trial judge discretion to impose double or treble
damages. In all instances, this would recompense injured parties. Beyond compensa-
tion, the trial court could then penalize the purposeful violator without imposing
the harsh penalty of multiple damage on innocent actors.
ATr'Y GrN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUsr R ,. 379 (1955). But the proposal has been criticized
as unrealistic, for it is improbable that many courts would resort to doubling or trebling
damages. See McConnell, The Treble Damage Issue: A Strong Dissent, 50 Nw. U.L. Rv.
342, 343 (1955). The basis of this proposal is a fairness consideration which would relieve
unwitting offenders from the harshness of treble damage liability. The idea of eliminating
the treble damage remedy in order to achieve realistic participation by private parties in
antitrust enforcement has not been explored.
Again assuming that the litigated cases represent a fair index of private antitrust ac-
tivity, it could be argued that historically the retention of the bounty part of the private
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many private litigants to sue' 01 and might be feared as much by the
defendants as suits for treble damages which plaintiffs seldom win. The
penalty aspect of the treble damage action could be replaced by real-
action is not justified. The private litigant was envisioned in the Sherman Act as an inde-
pendent enforcer who was to uncover antitrust violations and arrest the offenders. Treble
damage recovery was the reward for undertaking the task. When in 1914 Congress ac-
knowledged that what had been expected of the private litigant was unreal, it attempted
to lessen his burden by permitting him the use of the Government's investigation efforts.
However, by linking the private action to the Government's anterior proceedings. Con-
gress did nothing for the concept of private enforcement as initially visualized. Congress
again overlooked that what the private litigant needed to perforn a true enforcement
function was the machinery that would enable him to procure the information necessary
to build a solid case. Instead, Congress in effect did two things: it recognized that the
real enforcement task of uncovering and arresting the offenders would have to be dis-
charged by the Government, and, by providing an additional inducement for injured
parties to sue after the Government's action, it made it easier for more private litigants
to deliver the punishing blows for which they had been armed by the Sherman Act.
Hence, Congress only reinforced the punishment aspect of the private action. In view
of the low penalty provided for violation of the Sherman Act, punishment supplemental
to that imposed at the prosecution by the Government was essential. To accomplish that
purpose, however, the dub with which the private police force had previously been armed
for other purposes may have proved somewhat heavier than necessary. If the private action
following the Government's proceedings served only to compound the punishment that
would make violation unrewarding, that punishment may more fairly and more effec-
tively be achieved by less than trebled recovery by scores of private litigants.
The immediate objections that would be raised to elimination of triple damages are
that without the attraction of an additional bounty fewer injured parties will be enticed
into initiating damage suits and that the private action would be stripped of its deter-
rence. However, it is probable that as many suits for actual damage would be prompted
by a further relaxation on the restrictions on recovery as by the prospect of the additional
damages. If more plaintiffs have a real opportunity for recovery, it is probable that the
potential violator will fear the private action no less because it is for actual damages.
The staggering costs of defending a private action, one of the principal concerns of the
antitrust defendant, would be just as high whether the suit is for actual or treble dam-
ages. The potential increase in defense costs resulting from a greater number of suits liti.
gated might itself serve as a deterrent. And added to the defendants' liability would be
the costs and attorneys' fees of the successful plaintiffs who, encouraged by the prospect
of easier victory, might proceed with the litigation undeterred by settiement pressures
from the defendants.
101. The prospect of recovering treble damages was never by itself successful in in.
ducing the private antitrust plaintiff into litigation. Even the additional assistance ex-
tended to the private litigant by the Clayton Act was not a significant stimulant to pri-
vate litigants. The combined inducement of triple damages and a judgment admissible
against the defendant as prima fade evidence produced only 129 private antitrust suits
between 1914 and 1940. See ATr'y GFN. NAT'L Co. M. ATImEusr REP., supra note 100, at
378 and A. D. NEALF, THE AN-rrrusr LAws OF THE UNrrED STATES OF A..IEmUC,% 389 (1960).
Underlying this sluggish record was the disheartening number of plaintiffs' victories re-
ported after litigation-only 9. Ibid. By contrast, 1186 private antitrust actions were com-
menced in the eleven year period from 1942 to 1952. ADsNmr!AnvE OFFice OF U.S.
CoURTs, ANN. REP. (1942-1952). Several factors other than a treble damage reiward may
be cited to account for this sudden outburst of private activity. The procedural reform
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istic sanctions in the criminal proceeding. 102 The possible effect of an
actual damages remedy on settlement must also be explored. The bur-
den imposed on judicial machinery by antitrust litigation could be
met by measures realistically designed to expedite disposition of these
cases.' 03 Similarly, Congress could consider providing for "blue ribbon"
juries capable of understanding complex antitrust issues; or juries
might be eliminated altogether in civil antitrust actions. Congress
should also examine the degree to which private parties have difficulty
in proving an antitrust violation even with the evidentiary aid granted
by Section 5. Although Section 5 is generally regarded as a benefit to
private parties, in view of judicial attitudes its full value may not al-
ways be realized.10 4 Congress could provide instead, as proposed in the
reached a peak in 1938 when the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
relaxed requirements of pleading and eased preparation for trial by offering unprece.
dented opportunities for discovery by deposition, interrogatories, documents and admis-
sions. And with the Supreme Court's expansion of the compass of the commerce clause,
the plaintiff was considerably relieved of the added burden of proving the issue of effects
on commerce, a requirement that had frequently served as a barrier to recovery. Also
important in facilitating victory for the private suitor was the Supreme Court's decision
in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 (1946). In that case the Court rclaxed
the standards of proof for both causation and damages in the private antitrust action.
Possibly the most significant cause of the sudden animation of the private litigant was
the Government's energetic role in antitrust enforcement in the post.war period. The
prosecutions of the movie industry were probably the most significant stimulant to pri-
vate actions during that period. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp.
323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), 70 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), modified and remanded, 334 U.S. 131
(1948), 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Each of the factors cited played an important role
not only in facilitating litigation by private plaintiffs but also, more significantly, in
instilling confidence of success.
102. Following the electrical industry cases in 1960 several proposals were made to
strengthen the penalties for violation of the antitrust laws. S. 2252, 87th Cong., 1st Scss.
(1962) proposed to increase the Sherman Act penalties from $50,000 to $100,000. Upon a
second conviction within ten years of the first the fine would be up to $500,000 for cor-
porate defendants and up to $100,000 plus up to one year in prison for individuals. S. 2254,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962) would expand the liability of corporate directors from $5,000
to $100,000 and, upon a second conviction, a mandatory imprisonment of up to one year.
S. 996, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962), would allow the Attorney General to obtain an order
to restrain individuals and corporations convicted of antitrust violations from rendering
any further services to each other. See Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 52 Before the Sub.
committee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1962). See also Comment, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate
Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280 (1961), recommending a sys-
tem of proportional fines designed to deprive the violator of the profits made by the
illegal practices.
103. A recent proposal designed for this purpose would amend the Antitrust Expe.
diting Act, 56 Stat. 198 (1903), 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1964), so as to provide for a national panel
of antitrust judges. H.R. 6766, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
104. Section 5, in and of itself, means little to a plaintiff unless he fortifies its im-
pact upon the minds of the jury with a dramatic reproduction, de novo, of the same
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Hart bill, a conclusive effect for Government judgments.1°3 Or it could
allow the private plaintiff to rely on the Government judgment to
make out his case and impose the burden of disproving guilt by a
preponderance of the evidence on the defendant. Perhaps an equally
useful approach to facilitating the plaintiff's case would be to give him
access to the investigation records, proofs, and other evidence used by
the Government to convict the defendant. Whatever may be the merit
of these suggestions after full examination, they serve to illustrate that
there are many hidden facets to the current problem. If there is any
substance to the speculation about why the courts and the Government
administer the nolo plea the way they do, Congress would err in assum-
ing that the role of the private litigant could be enlarged simply by
repealing the current proviso.
Another preliminary inquiry that Congress should make before en-
acting legislation regarding the nolo plea is into the desirability of
limiting or expanding the Government's control over whether the nolo
plea is accepted. A decision on this question involves the answer to
two other questions. How much control should the Government have
over the amount of private enforcement that may follow a Govern-
ment proceeding? And, how much control should the Government
have over which of its own cases go to trial? The nolo plea allows the
Government a half-way prosecution. With it, the Government can rep-
rimand a defendant without exposing him to the full stigma of crim-
kind of evidence which resulted in the Government's earlier victory. . . . Section 5
substantially decreases neither the length of treble damage suits, the extent of trial
preparation nor the cost. . ."
Communication to Yale Law Journal cited in Note, Clayton Act, Section 5: Aid to Treble
Damage Suitors, 61 YAI.E L.J. 417, 425, n.33 (1952).
As a practical matter, the use of a criminal judgment to prove the existence of a
public conspiracy is of very little value. . . [It is] usually desirable to introduce
proof of the public conspiracy outside of the criminal judgement."
Ibid. See also HAMm-ON & TILL, supra note 85. But see Testimony of Jerrold G. Van
Cise, Hearings on H.R. 7905 Before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1950).
105. The original Section 5 of the Clayton Act as passed by the House provided a
conclusive effect for Government judgments. Doubts as to its constitutionality led the
Senate to substitute the prima fade evidence provision in its place. See 51 Co.a. Rae
13,851 (1914) (remarks of Senator 'Walsh); SaN. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 45 (1914).
And see generally 4 WVxGMoRa, EvmENca § 1353 (1940). The constitutional challenge is
based on the claim that the provision would deny due process to the defendants by
denying them a full defense in the private action. But the claim is unfounded, since the
defendants would have all the guarantees of due process in the Government proceeding.
with rights of appeal to correct any errors. And the scope of application of the Govern-
ment judgment would still be subject to judicial control. Other attempts have been made
to enact the conclusive effect provision. See, e.g., H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950);
S. 2512, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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inality and without increasing his exposure to treble damage liability.
A defendant is much more likely to accept this kind of reprimand with-
out a trial than he is a reprimand which precedes numerous treble
damage suits. Under the current law, the Government can attempt
half-way prosecutions by not contesting acceptance of the plea.
Congressman Celler's proposal would give the Government total dis-
cretion to use these half-way prosecutions. This solution may be proper
if the Government's allocation of its scant antitrust resources is a sig-
nificant consideration in its position on nolo pleas and if there are in-
deed cases which should be resolved short of full prosecution. Senator
Hart's bill, however, would limit the Government's prosecutorial flex-
ibility. The bill would remove the most important inducement that
the Government can give to the defendant-immunity from Section 5.
Without this inducement the Government will have much less control
over which cases go to trial. The defendant might nevertheless decide
to avoid the expense of trial and the possible stigma of a conviction and
might therefore plead nolo contendere. But a decision to press for ac-
quittal is equally possible since only acquittal would insure against sub-
sequent treble damage actions. In either event under Hart's bill there
is little the Government can offer to induce the defendant to forego
trial.
Another element of prosecutorial discretion is affected by the Con-
gressional proposals. Although the Government has not stated that
its past failures to contest nolo pleas involved considerations of the
fairness of subjecting certain defendants to greater treble damage lia-
bility, it is arguable that this factor has entered into prosecutorial de-
cisions. The Hart proposal seems to assume that such considerations
should not be entrusted to the Government and also that weight should
not be given to any other considerations which might have prompted
the Government to accept less than full prosecution. The assumption
underlying the Hart proposal may be correct. Perhaps the Government
should not have the discretion to protect certain defendants from the
stigma of criminality and potential treble damage liability. Whether
the Government should have some control over the form and degree
of prosecution and punishment cannot, however, be answered without
knowing the Government's view and the motivating elements in its
prior decisions not to contest nolo contendere pleas. This information
should be brought before the Hart Committee and must be considered.
